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THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
TO GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY
In 1957 Florida became the first American jurisdiction to
abolish the rule that government entities are immune from tort
liability when acting in a governmental, rather than a proprietary, capacity.' The trend toward governmental tort liability
has become so strong that at least twenty-six jurisdictions have
either judicially abolished or modified the immunity rule.2
Some courts have simply made categorical statements that a
government body shall be liable for its torts.3 However, most
courts and commentators have emphasized that not all injurycausing governmental acts create liability, even though they
would be tortious if committed by a private person.4 Courts
1. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
2. Spencer v. General Hosp., 425 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1969); City of Fairbanks v.
Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alas. 1962); Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384,
381 P.2d 107 (1963); Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Muskopf v.
Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Evans v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971); Hargrove v. Town of
Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d 937
(1970); Molitor v. Kaneland Com. Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960); Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 284 N.E.2d 733 (1972);
Klepinger v. Board of Comm'rs Co., 143 Ind. App. 155, 239 N.E.2d 160 (1968); Haney
v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); Board of Comm'rs v. Splendour
Shipping & Enterprises Co., 273 So. 2d 19 (La. 1973); Sherbutte v. Marine City, 374
Mich. 48, 130 N.W.2d 920 (1964); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111
N.W.2d 1 (1961); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118
N.W.2d 795 (1962); Johnson v. Municipal Univ., 184 Neb. 512, 169 N.W.2d 286 (1969);
Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 160 N.W.2d 805 (1968); Rice v. Clark County,
79 Nev. 253, 382 P.2d 605 (1963); Merrill v. City of Manchester, 114 N.H. 722, 332 A.2d
378 (1974); Willis v. Department of Cons. & Econ. Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34
(1970); Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975); Kitto v. Minot Park Dist.,
224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1974); Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584,
305 A.2d 877 (1973); Becker v. Beaudoin, 106 R.I. 562, 261 A.2d 896, rehg. denied, 106
R.I. 838, 261 A.2d 896 (1970); Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1975);
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962); Jivelekas v. City
of Worland, 546 P.2d 419 (Wyo. 1976).
3. See, e.g., Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971);
Jivelekas v. City of Worland, 546 P.2d 419 (Wyo. 1976).
4. See, e.g., Elgin v. District of Columbia, 337 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Muskopf
v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Hargrove
v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Spanel v. Mounds View School
Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962); Merrill v. City of Manchester,
114 N.H. 722, 332 A.2d 378 (1974); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115
N.W.2d 618 (1962); K. DAvis, ADMwsTRATrVE LAW TREATis. §§ 25.00 et seq. (1970
Supp.); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HAiv. L.
REv. 209 (1963); Reynolds, The DiscretionaryFunction Exception of the FederalTort
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abolishing governmental immunity have not only had to determine the principles on which some limited immunity should be
retained but have also been required to develop standards for
distinguishing the type of government actions which give rise
to liability from those which do not.5

I.

THE NEED FOR IMMUNITY

A major difference between government and private entities
lies in the types of activities performed by governmental bodies, many of which are not paralleled in the private sector.' As
one author points out,
The power to prescribe what conduct is unlawful, and to
arrest, prosecute and imprison persons for violations thereof,
for example, is solely allocated to public agencies. Similarly,
one finds no exact counterpart in private life.

. .

to promul-

gate and invoke civil sanctions, e.g., licensing systems, in aid
of many types of regulatory measures. Certain types of public
welfare activities, including such protective measures as fire
prevention and suppression, flood control and water conservation, and water and air pollution control, as well as beneficial services in the areas of public health, recreation, sanitation, education and local transportation, are also typically
engaged in to a7 greater degree by public entities than by
private persons.

The difference in the nature of activities has several implications for governmental tort liability. Often activities are performed by the government because they carry too great a risk
of harm to be undertaken by private persons, e.g., arresting and
imprisoning wrongdoers and providing fire protection.8 Additionally, because the tort system has little experience with inClaims Act, 57 GEO. L. J. 81 (1968); Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A
Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L. F. 919.
5. Because the decisions vary greatly in the scope of government entities covered
by their holdings, this paper will refer generally to "government liability." This includes all state level liability, whether of the state itself or local political subdivisions.
Unless otherwise noted, it does not refer to the United States government.
6. See City of Louisville v. Louisville Seed Co., 433 S.W.2d 638 (Ky. 1968); Brown
v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430,._., 160 N.W.2d 805, 810 (1968) (Newton, J., dissenting); 4 CALIF. L. REv. COMM'N 801, 810 (1963); 5 CALIF. L. REV. COMM'N 5, 269-71 (1963);
Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 463 (1963).
7. Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 463, 468 (1963).
8. City of Louisville v. Louisville Seed Co., 433 S.W.2d 638 (Ky. 1968).
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juries caused by these functions, it is difficult to reduce the
impact of liability by purchasing insurance or taking other protective measures.
A private person faced with the probability that his actions
will produce tort liability has several options: pursue the activity in the face of the risk; modify the activity to reduce the risk;
or, abandon the activity altogether. Government bodies often
do not have such options. Although potential liability encourages elimination or modification of dangerous activities, it has
little affect on governments performing duties mandated by a
constitution or legislative enactment?
All governmental bodies, especially local units, are continually faced with the problem of limited financial resources.' 0
Private persons also have limited funds, but they are not required to perform mandatory duties or restricted to particular
forms of fund raising. The availability of insurance and statutory limits on recovery do reduce the impact of this problem,"1
but even with insurance and recovery limits, tort liability
means that a higher percentage of public funds must ultimately be devoted to payment of claims.
Although seldom emphasized by commentators, the effect
of potential tort liability on the zeal of public officers and employees is another factor to be considered.1 2 Government officials should not be deterred from diligent pursuit of their duties
because of a fear of tort liability arising from their actions.
The position of a government employee or officer is similar
to that of an agent of a private corporation. The agent may
expose the corporation to liability while not being personally
liable, or he may be covered by the principal's insurance so that
he does not bear the financial brunt of his torts. It is not neces9. Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 160 N.W.2d 805, 809 (1968) (dissenting
opinion); 4 CALIF. L. REv. COMM'N 801, 810 (1963); 5 CALIF. L. REv. COMM'N 5, 269-71
(1963). It will be noted that the former governmental-proprietary distinction, at least
in theory, avoided this problem by only making governments liable for activities comparable to those undertaken by private individuals.
10. Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 160 N.W.2d 805, 810 (1968) (Newton,
J., dissenting).
11. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 895.43 (1975).
12. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968); James,
Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 610 (1955);
Note, The DiscretionaryFunctionException of the FederalTort ClaimsAct, 66 HARv.
L. REv. 488, 495-96 (1963). But see Note, The DiscretionaryImmunity Doctrine in
California, 19 HASTINGS L. J. 561 (1968), which points out that some "dampening of
the ardor" is inevitable.
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sarily undesirable that government officers and employees be
concerned that their actions may create tort liability. In addition to the normal desire to do the job well, the employee or
officer who exposes the government unit to expensive litigation
and damages may lose his job. This certainly gives him a personal interest in avoiding tortious actions.
The principal reason for limiting the scope of government
tort liability, however, is the principle of separation of powers
inherent in our governmental system."3 The authority to make
some decisions is vested in certain government branches, departments, agencies, and officers; thus, it would be improper
for the judicial branch to review these decisions in tort actions.
This theory was most tersely stated by Justice Jackson in his
dissenting opinion in Dalehite v. United States: "[I]t is not a
tort for government to govern."' 4 The California Supreme
Court elaborated on this principle in Johnson v. State, stating
that there must be
an assurance of judicial abstention in areas in which the responsibility for basic policy decisions has been committed to
coordinate branches of government. Any wider judicial review, we believe, would place the court in the unseemly position of determining the propriety of decisions expressly entrusted to a coordinate branch of government.'II.

STANDARDS FOR GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY

Courts, commentators, and legislatures have had little difficulty determining that a total waiver of government immunity
is undesirable.'" However, devising standards to separate those
13. This reason has been stressed more heavily by courts than commentators,
probably because they are personally aware of the sensitivity of other branches of
government to judicial intrusion on their areas of decision making. See, e.g., Elgin v.
District of Columbia, 337 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782,
447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968); Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63,
200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960). The great majority of cases make at least some reference to
this principle, either through an analysis of the theory or by a flat statement that
certain areas of government decision making retain immunity. See also K. DAVs,
ADMINisTmArivE LAW TREATSE §§ 25.08 et seq. (1970 Supp.); Reynolds, The Discretionary FunctionException of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEo. L. J. 81 (1968); Note,
Separationof Powers and the DiscretionaryFunction Exception: PoliticalQuestion in
Tort Litigation Against the Government, 56 IowA L. REv. 930 (1971).
14. 346 U.S. 15, 57 (Jackson, J. dissenting) (1953).
248 P.2d 352, 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240,
15. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, -,
248 (1968) (emphasis in original).
16. See N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 8 (McKinney 1963); WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 4.92.090
(1975 Supp.). In these states, the courts have found it necessary to create judicial
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acts that should be protected from those that should create
liability has proved to be a complex task. The most common
approach is to provide immunity for actions which should not
be subjected to judicial review under the separation of powers
doctrine. 7 The remainder of this article will examine various
formulations of this rule of governmental immunity.
A. The DiscretionaryFunctionException
The basis of this rule is that a "discretionary function"
performed by a governmental unit does not give rise to tort
liability. The older rule of liability only for proprietary activities and not for governmental functions looked only to the level
at which the decision is made to undertake the activity and did
not consider the nature of activity. Now, however, any funccan come
tion, whether "governmental" or "proprietary,"
8
within the discretionary function exception.
The discretionary function rule originated with the Federal
Tort Claims Act of 1946,19 which exempted
[a]ny claim .

.

. based upon the exercise or performance or

the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved is
abused. 2
Several states have enacted legislation patterned after the
federal act, 2' and others have judicially adopted the discretionexceptions. See, e.g., Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409
(1960); Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440
(1965). But see Note, The DiscretionaryException and Municipal Tort Liability:A
Reappraisal, 52 MIN. L. Rav. 1047 (1968) for the proposition that the reasons for
retaining immunity at the national and state level do not apply to local government
units.
17. Some courts, for example, follow a rule that the victim of government action
can only recover if he can show a government duty owed to him as an individual, not
just to the general public. Duran v. City of Tucson, 20 Ariz. App. 22, 509 P.2d 1059
(1973); Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 204 N.E.2d 635, 256 N.Y.S.2d
595 (1965). Another rule is that there is no liability for nonfeasance, Riss v. City of
New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968), but that once the
government voluntarily undertakes an action, it is liable for misfeasance. Veach v. City
of Phoenix, 102 Ariz. 195, 427 P.2d 335 (1967).
18. See Spencer v. General Hosp., 425 F.2d 479 (1969) for a good discussion of this
point.
19. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-80 (1970).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2608(a) (1970).
21. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 9.50.250(1) (1973); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 820.02 (West
1966); IOWA Co. ANN. § 25A.14.1 (West 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.03(6) (West
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ary function exception.22 The major problem with this rule is
the lack of an adequate standard for determining what is a
discretionary function. No legislature to date has attempted to
define precisely what this term means. The courts have developed three basic interpretations: a literal or semantic definition, a standard which distinguishes "planning level functions"
from "operational level functions," and a flexible approach
which evaluates the particular facts in light of the purpose of
the exception. However, none of these approaches provide a
standard which clearly separates those activities that are protected from those for which the government is properly liable.2
1. The Literal or Semantic Interpretation
Courts have encountered problems in applying the discretionary function rule because there is some measure of discretion involved in nearly every activity undertaken by a government official, employee, or agency.24 For a time, the lower appellate courts in California labored unsuccessfully to develop
a dictionary definition of "discretion" which established liability for minor discretionary actions and preserved immunity for
higher level decisions. However, this definitional approach was
rejected by the California Supreme Court in the case of
Johnson v. State.25 In Johnson, the court relied on Lipman v.
Brisbane Elementary School District,6 decided before Califor1963); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.265(2)(d).
22. Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960); Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).
23. The literature on this point, especially on the Federal Tort Claims Act, is
extensive. See Reynolds, The DiscretionaryFunction Exception of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 57 GEO. L. J. 81 (1968); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. Rv. 209 (1963); Note, The Discretionary Function
Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 66 HARV. L. REv. 488 (1963); Peck, The
Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposed Construction of the Discretionary Function
Exception, 31 WASH. L. REV. 207 (1956). Although these and other authors have suggested methods of construing the discretionary function rule, none has been able to
devise a standard that would fulfill the purpose of maintaining separation of powers
while clearly delineating acts creating liability from those which should be immune.
For the suggestion that separation of powers should be only one of several factors in
determining liability, see Note, Separationof Powers and the DiscretionaryFunction
Exception: Political Question in Tort Litigation Against the Government, 56 IOWA L.
REV. 930 (1971).
24. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968); Roberts, The DiscretionaryImmunity Doctrine in California,19 HASTINGS L.J. 561 (1968).
25. 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
26. 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961).
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nia adopted a legislative discretionary function rule, for the
following proposition:
Although it may not be possible to set forth a definitive rule
which would determine in every instance whether a governmental agency is liable for discretionary acts of its officials,
various factors furnish a means of deciding whether the
agency in a particular case should have immunity, such as
the importance to the public of the function involved, the
extent to which government liability might impair free exercise of the function, and the availability to individuals affected of remedies other than tort suits for damages?
The Johnson approach, which based the immunity determination on a consideration of policy factors, effectively laid to
rest the semantic test of the discretionary function exception.
No case since Johnson has seriously attempted to apply a semantic interpretation to determine the discretionary function
question.
2. Planning vs. Operational Level of Decision Making
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act and several state statutes patterned after the federal act, decisions made at the
"planning level" are discretionary functions while "operational
level" functions are not.2 The distinction was first made in
Dalehite v. United States,2 the leading Supreme Court case
construing the federal act. Dalehite arose out of the extensive
27. Id. at 230, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99. Lipman was a companion case
to Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89
(1961), which rejected government immunity from tort liability as mistaken and unjust. Lipman and Muskopf set forth a judicial rule that government immunity should
continue for discretionary acts. The California legislature responded with an extremely
comprehensive statute attempting to delineate specifically which government actions
would create liability. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1966). The statute was
based on a study and subsequent recommendations made by the California Law Revision Commission. 4 CAL. LAw Rv. COMM'N 801 (1963) and 5 CAL. LAw Rav. COMM'N 5
(1963). In addition to the numerous specific government actions rendered immune by
the act, there is also a catch-all discretionary function exception, § 820.02, which was
definitively construed in Johnson. Although Johnson is of limited application in its
home jurisdiction because most actions that might otherwise come within the discretionary function exception are covered by specific provisions, Johnson is the leading
case on construction of the discretionary function exception.
28. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); State v. Abbot, 498 P.2d 712
(Alas. 1972); Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968);
Rogers v. State, 51 Hawaii 293, 459 P.2d 378 (1969); Silver v. City of Minneapolis, 284
Minn. 266, 170 N.W.2d 206 (1969); Carroll v. State, 27 Utah 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972).
29. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:163

damage caused whenammonium nitrate fertilizer manufactured under the direction of the United States government exploded while being loaded for export. The Court looked primarily to the level of government at which the decision to act was
made to determine whether the exception applied:
It is unnecessary to define, apart from this case, precisely
where discretion ends. It is enough to hold, as we do, that the
"discretionary function or duty" that cannot form a basis for
suit under the Tort Claims Act includes more than the initiation of programs and activities. It also includes determinations made by executives and administrators in establishing
plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there
is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion.
It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out
the operations of government in accordance with official
directions cannot be actionable. If it were not so, the protection of § 2680(a) would fail at the time it would be needed,
that is, when a subordinate performs or fails to perform a
causal step, each action or nonaction being directed by the
superior, exercising, perhaps abusing, discretion.
The Court held that the original cabinet-level decision to
undertake the fertilizer export program clearly brought the action within the planning area. Any subsequent acts of negligence were therefore immune because once an initial decision
is within the discretionary function exception, all actions to
carry it out are also immune. Since the activity involved was
clearly the result of a planning level decision, the court was not
required to map out a boundary between planning and operational level functions.
The breadth of the exception set out in Dalehitehas caused
considerable confusion. Many federal courts have developed
more limited rules.3" State courts have used the decision as a
touchstone for interpreting the discretionary function exception. Thus, planning level functions are generally interpreted
to be those requiring basic policy decisions, while operational
level functions are those that implement policy. The Dalehite
suggestion that implementation of policy is also immune has
never been adopted by the state courts.
30. 346 U.S. at 35-36 (emphasis added).
31. See Reynolds, The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 57 GEO. L.J. 81 (1968).
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Johnson v. State3 is the leading state case construing the
discretionary function exception. The plaintiff in Johnson was
assaulted by a juvenile parolee placed in her home as a foster
child by a state parole officer. She alleged that the officer was
negligent in not warning her of the youth's known aggressive
tendencies. The state contended that the decision to place the
boy in her home without a warning was a discretionary function.
In addition to its disapproval of the semantic approach, the
court rejected the proposition that broad immunity is necessary to avoid unduly dampening the zeal of public officers and
employees. The Johnson court adopted a rule that "basic policy decisions" alone fall within the scope of the immunity.3
This rule is based on the separation of powers concept. Since
responsibility for basic policy decisions is vested in other government branches, these decisions should not be reviewed by
the courts. The court relied on Dalehite34 to distinguish between planning and operational level decisions. However, the
court rejected the Dalehite reasoning that the execution of
immune policy decisions should also be protected.3 5 Although
the initial decision to parole a juvenile is a policy decision
within the discretionary function exception, the court ruled
that the parole arrangement and the decision to warn the foster
parents of the juvenile's history were operational level decisions
not protected by the discretionary function rule: "Although a
basic policy decision (such as standards for parole) may be
discretionary and hence warrant governmental immunity, subsequent ministerial actions in the implementation of that basic
decision still must face case-by-case adjudication on the ques'3
tion of negligence.
Although the court in Johnson acknowledged that the
planning-operational distinction lacked certainty and predictability, it felt that this deficiency was overridden by its emphasis of the considerations behind the rule of governmental immunity:
Admittedly, our interpretation will necessitate delicate ques32. 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).

33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at _ 447 P.2d at 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
Id., 447 P.2d at 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
Id., 447 ?.2d at 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
Id. at -, 447 P.2d at 362, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
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tions; the very process of ascertaining whether an official determination rises to the level of insulation from judicial review requires sensitivity to the considerations that enter into
it and an appreciation of the limitations on the court's ability
to re-examine it. Despite these potential drawbacks, however, our approach possesses the dispositive virtue of concentrating on the reasons for granting immunity to the governmental entity. It requires us to find and isolate those areas
of quasi-legislative policy-making which are sufficiently sensitive to justify a blanket rule that courts will not entertain
a tort action alleging that careless conduct contributed to the
governmental decision.37
Johnson has been widely followed by other states interpreting statutory discretionary function exceptions. The Alaska
Supreme Court, in State v. Abbot, 8 adopted the planningoperational distinction. After reviewing federal interpretation
of the exception and the confusion caused by the overbreadth
of Dalehite, the court held that the Johnson test "has the analytic virtue of focusing on the reasons for granting immunity to
the governmental entity."3 9 The court in Abbot rejected the
state's contention that failure to exercise reasonable care in
maintaining highways came within the exception:
Although it is true, as the state contends, that the district
engineer's decision as to how many men and how much
equipment were necessary to maintain this particular stretch
of highway involved a certain amount of planning and discretion, it is not the kind of broad policy decision at which the
exception . . .is aimed. Once the initial policy determination is made to maintain the highway throughout the winter
by salting, sanding and plowing it, the individual district
engineer's decisions as to how that decision should be carried
out in terms of men and machinery is made at the operational
level; it merely implements the basic policy decision. 0
Hawaii adopted a similar construction of discretionary
function immunity in Rogers v. State,4' holding that the state's
decisions as to where to place highway signs and how frequently to repaint highway center stripes are operational level
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at -, 447 P.2d at 360-61, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 248-49.
498 P.2d 712 (Alas. 1972).
Id. at 721.
Id. at 722.
51 Hawaii 293, 459 P.2d 378 (1969).

COMMENTS

19771

decisions. Operational acts were defined as "those which conmatters, not requiring evaluation of
cern routine, everyday
42
broad policy factors.

Rejecting a broad Dalehite interpretation, the Utah Supreme Court cited Johnson in a case with substantially the
same facts as Rogers, and reached a similar conclusion.43 Minnesota has held that the discretionary function exception applies to the deployment of police and fire departments during
riots,44 but not to the failure of municipal officials to prevent
dogs from running loose.4
3. Evaluation of the Purpose of Immunity
Although the planning-operational test can be stated as a
concise formula, the courts have not applied it rigidly. Instead
they have carefully evaluated the purpose to be served by immunity to decide which decisions should be considered planning level, and hence discretionary and immune. This decision
usually involves a determination of whether the activity is a
basic policy decision. Other jurisdictions, often those without
a statutory discretionary function rule, eliminate the intermediate step of making the planning-operational determination
and inquire whether the decision is the kind that is delegated
to a coordinate branch of government and therefore immune
from judicial review. In effect, there is little difference between
results obtained under each of the two approaches. The distinction is mainly one of semantics.
The courts that reject the planning-operational test do so
on the grounds that it is impossible to devise a precise formula
to distinguish acts for which the government is properly liable
in tort from those in which it should retain immunity. Although these courts have done an excellent job of evaluating
the implications of the separation of powers doctrine on tort
liability and immunity, there has been little consideration of
the other reasons which support retention of governmental
immunity. Occasionally a court has mentioned that other factors should enter into the decision," but no court has actually
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 298, 459 P.2d at 381.
Carroll v. State, 27 Utah 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972).
Silver v. Minnesota, 284 Minn. 266, 170 N.W.2d 206 (1969).
Hansen v. City of Saint Paul, 298 Minn. 205, 214 N.W.2d 346 (1974).
Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968); Smith
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applied any other factors while deciding the case before it.
An early case of this type is Weiss v. Fote.4 8 New York by
statute had waived government tort immunity, with no express
exceptions. In spite of the statute, the Weiss court held that
[t]o accept a jury's verdict as to the reasonableness and
safety of a plan of governmental services and prefer it over
the judgment of the governmental body which originally considered and passed on the matter would be to obstruct normal
governmental operations and to place in inexpert hands what
the Legislature has seen fit to entrust to experts. 9
No attempt was made to reduce the rule to a formula. The
court clearly intended that the immunity decision rest solely
on an evaluation of whether or not the decision of the governmental body should be final. Thus, the Weiss court ruled that
the programming of traffic signals is not a reviewable decision.
An interesting evaluation of the purpose of governmental
immunity appears in the decision in Elgin v. District of
Columbia." In Elgin, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia effectively abrogated traditional government tort
immunity while denying that it was doing so. The plaintiff, a
pupil at a Washington school, alleged that his fall into a depressed area around the school basement was caused by the
negligent failure to keep a guardrail in repair. The district answered that maintaining school guardrails was a governmental
act and therefore immune under the governmental-proprietary
immunity test. Although the court stated that it would not
abolish the tort immunity doctrine, it abandoned the
governmental-proprietary standard and adopted the rule that
"discretionary" acts are immune while "ministerial" acts are
not.5 '
Professor Davis pointed out that this was the equivalent of
formally ending immunity but still preserving an area of immune acts based on the separation of powers concept. 2 The
v. Cooper, 475 P.2d 78 (Or. 1970); Evangelical United Brethren Church v. Washington,
67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).
47. This failure was severely criticized in Note, Separation of Powers and the
DiscretionaryFunction Exception: Political Question in Tort LitigationAgainst the
Government, 56 IOWA L. Rlv. 930 (1971).
48. 7 N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960).
49. Id. at 585-86, 167 N.E.2d at 66, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
50. 337 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
51. Id. at 154.
52. 3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 25.01 (1965 Supp.).
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Elgin court recognized that the trend is not to impose blanket
liability, but rather to develop more rational criteria for separating those government acts that should give rise to tort liability from those that should not.
The Elgin court recognized the need to define the terms
used in the discretionary-ministerial test. To do this, it looked
to reasons behind the retention of immunity. Rather than analyzing the nature of the particular act involved, the court focused its attention on the level at which the action was initiated. Thus, when responsibility for making policy decisions is
vested in a government official or body, the Elgin standard
provides that such decisions should be final.
That analysis is more concerned with trying to distinguish
between the functions performed within an area of readily
recognizable governmental responsibility, than with undertaking to define precisely where the boundaries of that area
lie . . . . "Ministerial" connotes the execution of policy as
distinct from its formulation. This in turn suggests differences in degree of discretion and judgment involved in the
particular government act. Where those elements are important, it is desirable that they operate freely and without the
inhibiting influence of potential legal liability asserted with
the advantage of hindsight. To the extent that the rule of
municipal tort immunity continues to serve any useful purpose, this would appear to be that purpose; and its illumination in any given set of facts has been, and is, sought through
the function-discriminating exception.0
Applying this standard to the facts of the case before it, the
Elgin court ruled that the decision to repair or neglect broken
guardrails was a ministerial act which subjected the district to
liability if improperly done. 4
Five years after Elgin, the same court formally abolished
5
government tort immunity in Spencer v. General HospitalY
The decision in Spencer affirmed the discretionary function
test developed in Elgin."
53. 337 F.2d at 154-55.
54. Id. at 157. Chief Judge Bazelon wrote a short but intriguing concurring opinion

suggesting that even the discretionary-ministerial test is too restrictive. This opinion
is discussed below.
55. 425 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
56. Judge Wright in a concurring opinion expanded upon the idea put forth by
Judge Bazelon in Elgin that the discretionary test was a step in the right direction,
but inadequate. His opinion is discussed below.
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A flexible approach to the discretionary function exception
was adopted by the Oregon Supreme Court in Smith v.
Cooper.57 The discretionary function exception in Oregon was
originally adopted judicially and later incorporated into a government tort liability statute patterned after the Federal Tort
Claims Act. 8 Smith illustrates how the discretionary function
exception evolved from a mere semantic definition to a fluid,
purpose-oriented approach. The Smith court rejected any qualitative distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts
because "at some point along the continuum of discretion a
division must be made with liability on one side and immunity
on the other and this division must necessarily be arbitrary." 9
The court also rejected the planning-operational test of the
federal courts because it felt that test was likely to degenerate
into arbitrary labelling.
The Smith court failed to recognize, however, that the
planning-operational standard is actually a convenient shorthand analysis of whether action is taken at a policy level and
hence, whether the separation of powers doctrine requires judicial abstention. This is evident from the fact that the Smith
opinion stated that California, in Johnson, refused to adopt the
planning-operation test, whereas Johnson expressly stated that
it adopted the planning-operational distinction."
The Smith court concluded that proper application of the
discretionary function exception requires assessment of a variety of factors grounded on the reasons for the immunity rule.
It mentioned several factors, including the importance to the
public of the function, the extent to which government liability
would impair the exercise of the function, the availability of
other remedies, and whether the function required the use of
discretion in a literal sense." The court, however, made it clear
that
[t]he most decisive factor but [the] one most difficult to
articulate is that it is essential for efficient government that
certain decisions of the executive or legislative branches of
57.
58.
(1969).
59.
60.
at 248.
61.

256 Or. 458, 475 P.2d 78 (1970).
Jarrett v. Wills, 235 Or. 51, 383 P.2d 995 (1963); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.265(2)(d)
256 Or. at __, 475 P.2d at 85.
Id. at -, 475 P.2d at 87. See 69 Cal. 2d at
256 Or. at

-,

475 P.2d at 88.

-, 447 P.2d at 360, 73 Cal. Rptr.
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the government should not be reviewed by a court or jury.
The reason behind such factor is that the bases for the legislative or executive decision can cover the whole spectrum of the
ingredients for governmental decisions such as the availabil2
ity of funds, public acceptance, order of priority, etc.
Despite its statement that a variety of factors are to be considered in determining whether the government should be immune in a given situation, the court only considered whether
the decisions involved were entrusted to a coordinate branch of
government.
An excellent example of judicial reasoning on the standards
for government tort immunity is found in Evangelical United
Brethren Church v. State.3 The Washington statute contains
no express limitations or exceptions to government tort liability. The state is simply liable in tort "to the same extent as if
it were a private person or corporation."64 The court in
Evangelical noted that while the statute is intended to create
broad liability, it is limited in that only government actions
analogous to private acts can create liability. Immunity remains, therefore, for "the acts of governing." 6 Despite the obvious similarity to the governmental-proprietary rule, the court
followed the typical discretionary function approach in defining the type of government actions which constitute the discretionary "act of governing." The familiar separation of powers
concept was used to draw this line. Unlike most courts, the
Washington court established preliminary guidelines which are
useful in determining whether a particular government action
gives rise to liablity.
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a basic governmental policy, program, or
objective?
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential
to the realization or accomplishment of that policy, program,
or objective as opposed to one which would not change the
course or direction of the policy, program or objective?
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on
the part of the governmental agency involved?
62. Id., 475 P.2d at 88.
63. 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).
64. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.92.090 (1976 Supp.).
65. 67 Wash. 2d at -, 407 P.2d at 444.
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(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the
requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and
duty to do or make the challenged act, omission, or
decision?66
The Evangelical court held that affirmative answers to
these four questions required a finding that the action is discretionary or governmental and therefore immune. In the event
that there is no preliminary finding of immunity, the court
should inquire further to determine whether judicial review is
proper. The court in Evangelical determined that the establishment of a juvenile correction facility in such a way that a
juvenile delinquent with criminal tendencies was able to escape was a protected action under the four basic guidelines.
There was no need, therefore, to indicate what further facts and
circumstances would render an action discretionary even
though all four criteria were met. The Washington court has
not decided any subsequent cases involving situations where
immunity was considered even though all of the four basic
criteria were not met.
Washington has, however, added one limitation on the discretionary function exception. In King v. City of Seattle, 7 the
city was found to have arbitrarily refused to issue street use and
building permits. The Washington court stated that the policy
reasons behind the discretionary function exception do not
apply when the government acts arbitrarily and capriciously.
Because there was no evidence that "a policy decision, consciously balancing risks and advantages, took place," the lack
of a judgment by a coordinate branch allowed the court to
68
review the decision.
B. Immunity for Judicial and Legislative Functions
The most common formulation of an immunity rule based
on the separation of powers principle is the discretionary function exception. Three jurisdictions, however, provide that judicial, legislative, quasi-judicial, and quasi-legislative acts are
66. Id. at -,
407 P.2d at 445.
67. 84 Wash. 2d 239, 525 P.2d 228 (1974).
68. Id. at -, 525 P.2d at 233. The court cited Weiss and Johnson. Both of these
cases, however, had only stated the rule affirmatively. Neither stated expressly that
where there is not, in fact, a proper exercise of discretion, the exception should not
apply.
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not subject to judicial review.69 These states, Florida, Wisconsin, and Kentucky, were among the first to adopt a general rule
of government tort liability, and in none of these jurisdictions
has the standard for immunity been changed legislatively.
Commentators and judges have warned that both the
discretionary-ministerial and planning-operational tests can
break down into arbitrary labelling. 70 The judicial-legislative
test has been more susceptible to this danger because a court
may be forced into pigeonholing the numerous governmental
activities into "legislative" or "judicial" categories. This may
be termed the "literal approach." The other approach, the
"open method," requires the court to evaluate the purpose of
the immunity exception. Both methods provide a striking contrast to the painstaking analysis of some courts under the discretionary function doctrine. Neither of these approaches is
satisfactory in view of the availability of a well-developed,
purpose-oriented discretionary function rule.
1. Florida: The Literal Approach
When the Florida Supreme Court broke precedent by abolishing government tort immunity in Hargrove v. Town of
Cocoa Beach,7" it provided the caveat that "[w]e think it advisable to protect our conclusion against any interpretation
that would impose liability on the municipality in the exercise
of legislative or judicial, or quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial,
functions. ' 72 This did not prevent the court in Modlin v. City
of Miami Beach,73 from becoming enmeshed in the standard
definitional tangle. In Modlin, the plaintiff sued for damages
resulting from the negligence of the city building inspector.
The court ruled that this was an executive function, not within
the bounds of the immunity retained in Hargrove.74 It then
developed a definitional test for distinguishing quasi-judicial
69. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Haney v. City of
Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26,
115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
70. Elgin v. District of Columbia, 337 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring); Spencer v. General Hosp., 425 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Wright, J.,
concurring); Note, Separationof Powers and the Discretionary Function Exception:
Political Question in Tort Litigation Against the Government, 56 IowA L. Rav. 930
(1971).
71. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
72. Id. at 133.
73. 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967).
74. Id. at 73.
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acts from executive and administrative acts. 7 Thus, the court
laid the groundwork for a return to the rigid and often arbitrary
distinctions among government activities that had caused such
difficulty under the governmental-proprietary test.
The court in Modlin also made the inconsistent statement
that the underlying intent of Hargrove was to equate the tort
liability of municipal corporations with that of private corporations. 76 Similar statutory language in New York and Washington has been construed to imply a discretionary function immunity rule. 77 The Florida court failed to consider that many
executive and administrative functions have no counterpart in
the private area and, thus, under this rule, should be immune.
In Wong v. City of Miami,78 the plaintiff alleged negligence

in the deployment of police during riots. Confronted with a
situation where immunity seemed appropriate but the action
could not be pigeonholed into the quasi-judicial or quasilegislative categories, the court bypassed the Hargrove and
Modlin rules and appeared to adopt an approach similar to the
discretionary function exception:
While sovereign immunity is a salient issue here, we ought
not lose sight of the fact that inherent in the right to exercise
police powers is the right to determine strategy and tactics
for the deployment of those powers. The sovereign authorities
ought to be left free to exercise their discretion and choose the
tactics deemed appropriate
without worry over possible alle7
gations of negligence.

1

2. Wisconsin: The Open Approach
Wisconsin was among the earliest jurisdictions to abrogate
government tort immunity. Citing Hargrove, the Wisconsin
court stated in Holytz v. Milwaukee" that "[t]his decision is
not to be interpreted as imposing liability on a governmental
body in the exercise of its legislative or judicial or quasi75. Id. at 73-74.
76. Id. at 73.
77. Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960); Evangelical United Brethren Church v. Washington, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).
78. 237 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1970).
79. Id. at 134. The plaintiff in Florida First Nat'l Bank v. City of Jacksonville, 310
So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1975) attempted to use Wong as precedent for a broader discretionary
conduct rule. The court refused to accept the argument, appearing to confine Wong
to its facts.
80. 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
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legislative or quasi-judicial functions." 8' The court held that an
allegation that the city had negligently left open a trapdoor
covering a water meter pit stated a cause of action. Since this
was clearly not a quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative function,
the court did not have to determine the limits of retained immunity.
In Raisanen v. City of Milwaukee," the plaintiff alleged
that the city was negligent in programming the sequence of
traffic control signals at a stop light. The court dismissed the
action without reference to the legislative-judicial rule of
Holytz. The opinion, while concentrating on the facts, cited
Weiss v. Fote13 as authority that immunity extends to governmerit decisions in programming traffic signals. Weiss, however,
was decided under a discretionary function rule. The court
failed to consider that the legislative-judicial rule used in Wisconsin may have produced a different result.
The court did use the Holytz language in Dusek v. Pierce
County.8 4 The plaintiff in Dusek alleged negligence in failing to
erect highway warning signs. The court held, based on
Raisanen, that this was a legislative function.85 However, no
such language was used in Raisanen. There was no analysis in
Dusek of what constitutes a legislative function, nor any explanation of why programming a traffic control light is a legislative function.
Most recently, in Jorgensen v. Northern States Power
Company,8 the Wisconsin court reviewed its post-Holytz cases
and held that highway sign placement is an exercise of a legislative or quasi-legislative function."7 The court held that the
failure of the city to temporarily remove a light pole while the
power company was digging a trench alongside the pole was not
a legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial function. Again, the court made no inquiry into what factors bring
an activity within these categories. 8
The differing treatment that Florida and Wisconsin have
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 40, 115 N.W.2d at 625.
35 Wis. 2d 504, 151 N.W.2d 129 (1967).
7 N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960).
42 Wis. 2d 498, 167 N.W.2d 246 (1969).
Id. at 506, 167 N.W.2d at 250.
60 Wis. 2d 29, 208 N.W.2d 323 (1973).
Id. at 37, 208 N.W.2d at 327.
Id., 208 N.W.2d at 327.
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given the legislative-judicial rule illustrates two faults of the
formula.8 9 Florida has attempted to follow a consistent, analytical approach, carefully defining legislative and judicial action
and excluding immunity for any functions that do not fall into
these categories. Unfortunately, this tack leads to the artificial
and illogical results so severely criticized under the
governmental-proprietary rule. Except in its broadest form, it
ignores the purposes intended to be served by retaining immunity."
Wisconsin, on the other hand, has made no attempt to analytically determine the limits of its immunity rule. The court
determines whether the action involved should be immune,
and, if so, labels it as legislative. Wisconsin is groping toward
a discretionary function exception by an evaluation of the alleged action in light of the reasons which support governmental
immunity. Although Wisconsin's ad hoc method may produce
better results than Florida's rigid semantic approach, it is a
poor method of fashioning a rule of law. The Wisconsin court
would do better to consider explicitly adopting the discretionary function immunity rule which it seems to use implicitly.
C. Inclusion of Factors Other Than Separation of Powers
All of the rules discussed above are essentially grounded on
the separation of powers concept. Some courts and commentators have advanced several reasons for retaining a limited government tort immunity, but the standard actually adopted is
designed only to prevent courts from substituting their judgment for that of a coordinate branch of government in matters
of public policy. The suggestion has been made, however, that
this analysis is too limited and that a broad standard encompassing several factors would be more responsive to the needs
of both government and the public.
The concurring opinions in Elgin91 and Spencer v. General
Hospital,92 warned that the adoption of any formula would lead
to rigid and arbitrary classification of government acts without
reference to the purpose of immunity. Chief Judge Bazelon,
concurring in Elgin, was concerned that the court "[i]n retain89. Kentucky stated the legislative-judicial rule in Haney v. City of Lexington, 386
S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964), but has not followed it in any subsequent case.
90. See footnotes 6 through 15, infra, and accompanying text.
91. 337 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
92. 425 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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ing a rigid classification of cases.

. .

harbors seeds of the same

arbitrariness which presently characterizes" the government
immunity rule.9 3 He suggested that "the existence and extent
of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff is to be determined in
the context of all the circumstances of the action of which the
plaintiff complains."94 The opinion, however, did not elaborate
on the types of circumstances that would be influential in determining whether immunity or liability is required.
In Spencer, Judge Wright, joined by Chief Judge Bazelon,
agreed that "the degree of discretion left to officials in the
performance of their duties [should] be merely one factor to
be weighed in the calculus of 'reasonable care'." 5 Judge Wright
warned that
[t]he Elgin position could easily rigidify into a rule that any
time an official or an agency adopts a "plan," injuries arising
from the plan itself, as distinguished from its negligent execution, cannot be compensated in tort. I would not want to take
the flat position that the government is immune from paying
for the consequences of the adoption of every policy, however
neglectful that policy might be of the bodily security or the
property of those affected by it."
As noted above, the courts in Johnson and Smith stated
that the importance to the public of the government function,
the extent to which liability might impair the exercise of the
function, and the availability to the injured party of remedies
other than tort actions were factors to be considered in determining whether the government is liable. Neither court, however, evaluated these factors in deciding the case before it. The
Washington court, in its otherwise excellent decision in
Evangelical United Brethren Church, stated that "other factors" than separation of powers may affect the determination,
but it gave no indication of what those factors might be.
An exhaustive recent review severely criticizes the assumption that the separation of powers principle is the controlling
factor and argues for a flexible method of evaluating and bal97
ancing all interests involved in the particular fact situation.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

337 F.2d at 157.
Id.
425 F.2d at 489.
Id. at 490.
Note, Separationof Powers and the DiscretionaryFunctionException: Politi-

cal Question in Tort LitigationAgainst the Government, 56 IOWA L. REV. 930 (1971).
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Any set formula is rejected as being likely to be applied mechanically and arbitrarily. Among the factors suggested are the
seriousness of the injury, whether the injury was an isolated
occurrence unlikely to be repeated, whether the government
induced reliance by the injured party, whether the injured
party has alternative remedies available, whether the government action was discretionary and whether the discretion was
abused, whether the action was a mandatory government duty
or a service voluntarily assumed, whether the negligence was
commission or omission, the burden placed on the government
by imposing liability, the general public interest, and the capacity of the judiciary for reviewing the case. 8 The method
recommended in this article obviously goes far beyond what
any court has attempted.
III.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The development of the immunity standard has evolved
from attempts to create a precise, predictable semantic definition into a flexible, if unpredictable, guideline. Almost all
courts that have abrogated the rule of government tort immunity have recognized that there must be some government acts
which are immune from tort liability. The predominant principle that the courts have followed in devising standards for government tort immunity is that acts that constitute
"governing," i.e., high level policy decisions for which coordinate branches of government are responsible, are not appropriate for judicial review. Guided by this controlling principle, the
courts and legislatures have developed a standard for immunity that is most frequently termed the discretionary function
exception.
The problem faced by the courts has been two-fold. It must
be determined where, along the continuum of decision making,
government actions rise to the level where immunity is appropriate. The courts must then formulate a test or rule that will
separate these decisions from those that should come within
the general rule of liability. Most courts have abandoned efforts to develop a set formula to resolve these issues. The trend
is to analyze the particular government action involved in
terms of the separation of powers principle. If the action is a
98. Id. at 974-83.
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basic policy decision that should not be subject to judicial
second-guessing, the government is immune from tort liability.
While some courts call this the difference between planning
level functions and operational level functions, it is generally
a legal conclusion rather than the starting point in the analysis.
The courts have been fairly successful in fashioning standards for determining which government acts are immune
solely on the basis of the separation of powers concept. The
technique of evaluating whether the act is a basic policy decision is a flexible tool, and the courts have generally avoided the
pitfall of merely categorizing government actions in a mechanical manner. The more basic issue, however, is whether there
are other factors of equal importance. No court has squarely
handled this issue, and the rule has become so firmly established that it is highly unlikely that any court will.
MAY F. WYANT

